SAPIENS

A Brief History of Humankind

Yuval Noah Harari — first published 2011

PART TEN OF ELEVEN

The Pie That Grows, and the Fire That Turns the Wheel

Chapter 16: The Capitalist Creed
Chapter 17: The Wheels of Industry

"Consumerism is the first religion in history whose followers actually do what they are told."

Chapter 17's best line, in my words

READ AND EXPLAINED BY LOVEPREET SINGH

I read the whole book myself. This is what I understood,
written the way I'd explain it to a friend.

WHERE WE LEFT OFF

Part Nine, in four paragraphs

So this part stands on its own, even if you have not read the last one.

Part Nine was about how the last five hundred years started, and the answer was not a discovery. It was an admission.

Before modern science, every great tradition assumed everything important was already known and written down. So anything the texts did not cover was not *unknown* — it was **unimportant**. What appeared around 1500 was a new category: a real question with no answer yet, which somebody could go and find out. The blank space on the map is that in one image — and I argued that the same blank space is also imperial erasure, because the space was not empty and the people in it knew perfectly well what was there.

Science works by observation and mathematics, and it is expected to produce **new powers**, not just understanding — which is why it turned into an industrial revolution rather than remaining a philosophical movement. And two Scottish churchmen calculating widows' pensions in 1744 built the foundation of the entire insurance industry, by working out how to calculate a future nobody can see.

But science does not fund itself. Somebody pays, and the payer chooses the questions. And in Chapter 15 we saw what that looked like: Cook's voyage measured the transit of Venus and opened the Pacific to conquest; the institutions that decoded hieroglyphics also manufactured scientific racism. Same ships, same universities, same method.

WHERE THIS PART FITS

Two chapters that explain more about your working week than anything else in the book.

Chapter 16 is capitalism, and it starts with a belief so strange it is hard to climb back inside: that the total amount of wealth in the world is fixed.

Chapter 17 is industry, and Harari reframes it as something much better than factories and mills — a revolution in **converting energy**. Then he applies the same logic to animals, and says something I have not been able to put down.

Both chapters contain arguments that made me uncomfortable in ways I could not dismiss, which is usually a sign they are worth the time.

When the pie was a fixed size

To understand modern money, you have to first understand the world it replaced. It is genuinely alien.

For most of human history, people believed the total amount of wealth in the world was **fixed**. A pie of a certain size. If your share grew, somebody else's had to shrink. There was no notion of the pie itself getting bigger, because in most people's experience it never had.

That belief has consequences everywhere, and they are not small.

LIFE INSIDE A FIXED PIE

Trade looks like theft with paperwork. If wealth is fixed, then a merchant who gets richer has taken it from somebody. This is a large part of why merchants were despised in so many societies for so long — the suspicion was structural, not personal.

Your neighbour's success is your loss. Not envy. Arithmetic, as everybody then understood it.

The sensible thing to do with money is bury it — or spend it on something impressive that lasts, like a building with your name on it. Money that sits still is not idle; it is safe.

And credit barely exists. Why would anybody lend you money in a world where the future holds no more than the present? What could you possibly repay them with, except by taking it from somebody else?

THE OLD BELIEF
your gain is my loss

THE NEW BELIEF
tomorrow can be bigger than today

FIGURE 1 *The belief that changed everything. On the left, any slice you take is a slice somebody else loses. On the right, the whole thing can get bigger — which is what makes lending against tomorrow a sane thing to do.*

Then, from around the sixteenth century, a different idea took hold, and it quietly rearranged everything: **the pie can grow**.

Total wealth is not fixed. It can be increased. The future can be bigger than the present.

Credit is trust in the future

One belief, and it creates the entire financial system on top of itself.

Follow what that single belief makes possible.

If tomorrow will be richer than today, then money can be lent against tomorrow. A baker with no capital can borrow against a bakery that does not exist yet, build it, sell bread, and repay the loan out of money that **had not been created when the loan was made**.

A WORD YOU WILL NEED — CREDIT

Credit: money lent now against value expected later.

It is not a loan of existing wealth from a person who has some to spare. In a growing economy it is closer to a claim on wealth that has not been produced yet, issued because everybody involved believes it will be.

Why it matters: **credit is trust in the future**, **converted into money in the present**. That is the whole engine, and it is an imagined reality in exactly the Part Two sense — real because enough people believe it, and capable of vanishing when they stop.

And notice the loop, because it is genuinely circular and it works anyway. Belief in growth creates credit. Credit funds expansion. Expansion produces growth. The growth justifies the belief.

It is a story that makes itself true by being believed, which is the most Sapiens thing in the entire book.

Adam Smith's moral revolution

Everybody knows the economics. Almost nobody notices that the radical part is a claim about virtue.

T**he Wealth of Nations**, 1776. Harari argues it is one of the most radical books ever written, and for a reason people usually miss.

Smith's famous claim: when an employer makes a profit and **reinvests** it — hires more workers, buys more equipment, expands production — everybody ends up better off. More jobs, more goods, more total wealth in the system.

What is radical about that is not the economics. It is the **morality**.

WHAT EVERY PREVIOUS ETHICAL SYSTEM SAID

Greed is a vice. Selfishness is something to be restrained, disciplined, confessed or punished. Wealth beyond need is morally suspect at best. Almost every religion and philosophy in this book, from every continent, says a version of this.

Smith says the opposite. Pursuing your own profit, under the right conditions, produces collective benefit. Egoism becomes altruism at scale, without anybody intending it.

That is a moral revolution disguised as an economics textbook. And once you see it as a moral claim you cannot unsee it — arguments about economic policy start sounding a great deal like theology, because that is partly what they are.

But here is the part everybody forgets, and it is load-bearing.

The whole argument depends on the reinvestment.

Profits that are hoarded, or spent on luxury, or moved offshore, produce none of the promised benefit. Smith's case only works if the money goes back into production.

So capitalism's central commandment is not *make money*. It is **reinvest your profits in production**. Everything moral that has ever been claimed for the system rests on that sentence being obeyed, and it is a sentence about behaviour rather than a law of nature.

A WORD YOU WILL NEED — CAPITAL AND WEALTH

Harari distinguishes two things we usually blur.

Wealth is money and goods sitting still — buried, hoarded, spent on a palace or a wedding.

Capital is money and goods put back into production.

An emperor who spends a fortune on a monument has converted capital into wealth. A merchant who ploughs his profits into more ships has done the reverse.

Why it matters: capitalism is, precisely, the belief that the second is a virtue and the first is a waste. That is not an obvious view. Most societies in this book held the opposite one.

Which is why Harari classifies capitalism as a **religion**, using his Chapter 12 definition: a system of values founded on a belief in a superhuman order — here, that growth is the supreme good and that market laws are simply how reality works. Sacred texts, prophets, heretics, schisms, and a first commandment.

Bubbles, reliability, and companies with armies

Where the chapter gets bloody, and where a private business ends up governing a subcontinent.

A bubble that helped bring down a monarchy

In 1719 and 1720, the Scottish financier **John Law** was running both France's central bank and the Mississippi Company, which held the rights to French territory in North America.

He talked up the colony's prospects. Share prices soared into a frenzy. Ordinary people poured in their savings. And then it collapsed, and the investors were wiped out.

But the crucial part is what it did to the state. The French monarchy's credit was wrecked, its borrowing costs rose, and its finances never fully recovered. Historians link that damage to the fiscal crisis that helped bring on the French Revolution seventy years later.

A financial bubble helped topple a monarchy. Credit is trust, and trust destroyed is a political event, not merely a financial one.

Why the Dutch, of all people

So why did the Netherlands — small, waterlogged, recently in revolt against Spain — become the financial centre of Europe?

Not resources. **Reliability**.

The Dutch repaid their debts, enforced contracts, and protected private property, including foreigners' property. So lenders trusted them. So they could borrow cheaply. So they could out-finance far larger and richer rivals.

In a credit economy, trustworthiness is a strategic weapon. Reputation is capital, and it compounds.

And then companies started conquering countries

The **Dutch East India Company** — the VOC — was founded in 1602 as a joint-stock company. Anybody could buy a share. And with that pooled money it built fleets, hired soldiers, fought wars, and conquered Indonesia.

Not a country conquering a country. **A company**, answerable to shareholders, conquering a country.

The Dutch West India Company did similar work in the Atlantic and founded New Amsterdam, which the English took in 1664 and renamed New York.

AND THE EXTREME CASE, WHICH IS OURS

The **British East India Company** was a private business with shareholders in London.

After the Battle of Plassey in **1757** it became the effective ruler of Bengal, and over the following decades of much of the subcontinent. It collected taxes. It waged wars. It maintained its own army, which for a period was larger than Britain's own.

Under its administration came famines including the Bengal famine of **1770**, in which millions died while revenue collection continued.

It ruled for a century, until the rebellion of **1857** finally forced the British Crown to take over directly in **1858**.

Sit with the shape of that. An enormous portion of India was governed, for around a hundred years, by a company pursuing returns for its investors — and the investors could check the value of their holding in a London newspaper without ever seeing the place or the people.

I said in Part Seven that I would not turn this into a ledger, and I am not. I am pointing at the mechanism, because the mechanism is the chapter's actual subject.

Two wars for a drug, and a trade nobody ordered

The hardest section in the chapter, and the argument I find most difficult to answer.

The Opium Wars

In the early nineteenth century Britain had a trade problem. It wanted Chinese tea, and China wanted very little that Britain produced. Silver flowed one way only.

British merchants solved it by selling **opium** into China — grown largely in India, sold through intermediaries, creating mass addiction and reversing the flow of silver.

When Chinese authorities moved to stop the trade, Britain went to war. Twice: **1839–42** and **1856–60**. Britain won both. China was forced to keep its ports open, and Hong Kong was ceded in the process.

Harari's line is that Britain fought two wars for the freedom to sell drugs, and conducted them in the vocabulary of free trade and open markets.

That is what "free trade" meant when the guns pointed one way, and it is worth remembering the next time the phrase is used as though it were self-evidently neutral.

And the trade nobody ordered

Roughly ten to twelve million Africans were transported across the Atlantic between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. Around seventy per cent worked on **sugar** plantations. The conditions killed people at a rate that required constant replacement, which is why the trade continued for three hundred years rather than ending once the plantations were staffed.

And here is Harari's point, which is the one that lands hardest in the entire book.

No government organised this.

HIS POINT, IN MY WORDS

There was no king who decreed it and no ministry that ran it. It was a **business**.

Slaving voyages were funded by shares sold on European exchanges. They were insured by underwriters who priced the risk, including the risk of death in transit, as a line item. They were run for returns that respectable people could look up.

Investors in London and Amsterdam bought into slaving ventures the way you would buy into a fund today. They collected the dividends. Most of them never saw a ship, never saw a port, and never met a single person they had helped to enslave.

The Atlantic slave trade was not a policy. It was a **market outcome**. Nobody had to hate anybody for it to happen. Capital flowed to where the returns were, and the returns were there.

That is the chapter's real warning, and it is not about the past. **The free market has no moral content**. It optimises for returns. If the highest returns come from human beings in a hold, that is where the money goes — unless something outside the market stops it.

Capitalism's three promises

He closes by naming three things capitalism asks you to believe, each of which is an article of faith rather than a demonstrated fact:

- That profits will be **reinvested** rather than hoarded.
- That growth will **continue** indefinitely.
- That the poor will **eventually benefit** from all of it.

Some of the time, in some places, all three have held. None of them is guaranteed by any mechanism, and 2008 was a fairly loud reminder that the guarantees were never there.

It was never really about factories

The best reframing in the second half of the book. Industry is about turning one kind of energy into another.

Most accounts of the Industrial Revolution start with mills and machines. Harari starts somewhere better: with **energy**.

For almost all of history, the only energy humans could use came from a short list. Muscle — yours, an ox's, or a slave's. Fire, for heat and light. Wind in a sail. Water turning a wheel.

Every one of those has a hard ceiling. You cannot make a horse pull harder. The wind blows when it blows.

And the deep problem is that energy is everywhere and almost none of it is usable. The sun pours an unimaginable amount onto the Earth every second. Wood, coal, oil and the atom are dense with it. Humans could see none of that and use almost none of it.

So the real trick of the Industrial Revolution was learning to **convert one kind of energy into another**.

And it began with a flooded mine

The first great conversion was the **steam engine**, and its origin is wonderfully unglamorous.

Coal mines flood. Getting water out of a deep mine using horses and buckets is slow and expensive. So in the early eighteenth century, engineers built machines that burned coal to boil water, and used the pressure of the steam to drive a piston, and pumped the water out.

Heat into motion. That is the whole idea, and it is the hinge of the modern world.



FIGURE 2 *The hinge. Once you can turn heat into movement, anything that burns can become anything that moves — and once movement becomes electricity, it can become almost anything at all.*

Once you can turn heat into movement, you can turn **anything that burns** into movement. And then somebody realises the piston does not have to pump water — it can drive a loom, a wheel, a ship's propeller. Coal becomes cloth. Coal becomes transport.

Then the internal combustion engine did it with oil, and turbines and generators did it with steam, falling water and eventually nuclear fission — heat into motion into **electricity**, which is the most convertible form of energy we have, capable of becoming light, heat, movement, sound or computation on demand.

THERE IS NO ENERGY SHORTAGE

This is Harari's conclusion and it surprised me.

The sun delivers vastly more energy to the Earth every day than the entire human race uses. The constraint has never been supply. It has always been our ability to **capture and convert**.

Which means every energy crisis in history has really been a conversion problem wearing a different hat.

One honest caveat, because he does not give it: that is a physicist's truth doing an economist's job. Usable, storable, deliverable energy at a price people can pay is a genuine constraint, and the fact that the sun radiates a great deal does not help anybody whose grid is down in July.

And new materials

The second half of the revolution was **materials**. New processes produced substances that had never existed, or that had existed and been unusable.

The best example is aluminium. It is one of the most common metals in the Earth's crust, and for most of history it was almost impossible to extract, which made it precious. In the mid-nineteenth century the French emperor **Napoleon III** is said to have reserved aluminium cutlery for his most honoured guests, while everybody else made do with gold.

Then electrolysis made extraction cheap, and within a few decades aluminium was what you wrapped sandwiches in.

Scarcity, it turns out, is often a technical problem — and technical problems get solved, and things that were priceless become disposable.

And then we pointed it at living things

The hardest section in the book. Harari stops being a historian here, and I think he is right to.

Industrial methods did not stop at factories. They were applied to **living animals**, and the results are what he describes as possibly the greatest crime in history.

The argument is precise and it is worth following properly.

THE ARGUMENT, STEP BY STEP

Domesticated animals have evolved needs that go far beyond food and water.

A hen has a powerful drive to scratch, to peck, to establish a pecking order, and to build a nest before laying.

A calf has an intense need to bond with its mother. That bond is not sentiment — it is a biological requirement, and it runs on the same machinery that runs in you.

A sow has a drive to build a nest before farrowing so strong that she will perform the entire sequence of motions on bare concrete with nothing whatever to build from.

Industrial farming meets the nutritional needs and ignores every other one — because the others do not appear in the output figures.

So: dairy calves are separated from their mothers within days, and the mothers call for them for days afterwards. Laying hens in many systems live in spaces too small to spread a wing, and male chicks, commercially useless, are killed at a day old, worldwide, in the billions. Breeding sows in some systems are held in crates barely larger than their bodies, unable to turn around, for most of their adult lives.

The cruelty is not malice. Nobody in that system is enjoying it. It is a measurement problem: an accounting framework with entire categories of suffering simply missing from the form.

And now Harari pulls the thread from Part Four tight.

Chickens, cattle and pigs are among the most evolutionarily successful large animals ever to exist. Tens of billions of them. By the only measure evolution uses — copies made — they have won more completely than any wild animal in history. The wolf is rare and protected; the dog is everywhere.

And the individual life of almost every one of them is misery from birth to slaughter.

That is Part Four's two scoreboards at full volume. Species-level success and individual wellbeing are not the same thing, they were never the same thing, and the gap between them is now measured in tens of billions of individual lives per year.

THE THING NOBODY QUESTIONS

Everybody arguing about this — Harari, his critics, people defending the industry, people attacking it — assumes that **crimes can be ranked on a single scale**.

"The greatest crime in history" is a comparative claim. To make it, you have to hold genocide, slavery, famine and industrial animal farming against each other on one axis, and Harari never says what that axis is or how the conversion works.

I want to be careful here, because there is a cheap version of this objection that is really a way of dismissing the whole subject, and that is not what I mean.

The facts he describes are not in dispute and they are appalling. What I am pointing at is that **the strongest sentence in the chapter is the least supported one** — and that reaching for a superlative is what people do when the plain description is not producing the reaction they want.

It did not need the superlative. The plain description is enough, and the superlative gives readers who want an exit an argument to leave by.

Whatever you eat, and whatever you conclude, I have not managed to put the underlying argument down, and I am not going to pretend to you that I have.

Somebody has to buy all this

The last section, and the line that made me put the book on the table.

Industry creates a problem nobody had before: **the ability to produce more than anybody needs**. A pre-industrial economy is limited by production. An industrial economy is limited by **consumption**. If the goods do not sell, the factories stop, people lose their jobs, and the whole system seizes.

So a new ethic had to be built, and it was.

A WORD YOU WILL NEED — THE CONSUMERIST ETHIC

The consumerist ethic: the belief that consuming is good. Not shameful, not indulgent — virtuous.

Treat yourself. You have earned it. Buying things is how you express who you are, look after yourself, and enjoy the life you have got.

Why it matters: look at how strange that is against everything before it. Almost every traditional ethic in this book — religious, philosophical, or plain peasant common sense — praised thrift, moderation and restraint. Frugality was a virtue and excess was a moral failure.

We flipped it in about a century.

And it pairs precisely with the capitalist ethic from Chapter 16, in a division of labour Harari lays out cleanly.

The rich are told to invest. Everybody else is told to spend.

Two commandments, two audiences, one system that requires both to be obeyed. And notice that neither group experiences its commandment as an instruction. The investor thinks he is being prudent. The spender thinks she is being kind to herself.

Then the line that made me stop reading for a minute.

Consumerism is the first religion in history whose followers actually do what they are told.

Nobody quite manages to love their enemies. Almost nobody gives away their possessions. Every faith in this book sets a standard its adherents fail, more or less gracefully, their whole lives.

But asked to buy things, treat ourselves, and upgrade — we deliver. Reliably. All of us. Every year.

I have read a great deal of criticism of consumerism and most of it slides off. That version did not.

THE THING NOBODY QUESTIONS

Both chapters — and almost every argument about economic growth anywhere — assume that **growth is what shows up in the output figures**.

What does not show up is anything nobody billed for.

I wrote about this at length in my Punjab series and it is the clearest example I know. Punjab grows rice, which is a thirsty crop in a region that does not have the water for it, and it is paid for the rice. The water table falls year after year. The rice appears in the growth figures. **The water has never been on the invoice**.

So the region is exporting groundwater and being paid for grain, and every measurement anybody takes says it is doing well.

That is not a Punjab problem, it is the shape of the accounting. Soil, water, air, forest, fisheries and climate all enter the books as free inputs and leave as somebody else's problem, usually somebody who is not born yet.

Harari has the tool to see this — it is his own two scoreboards from Chapter 5, exactly — and he does not turn it on growth itself, which is where it would do the most work.

SECTION NINE

Where I think he is wrong in these two chapters

Two strong chapters with one significant blind spot each.

1. The accounting on capitalism is one-sided

Chapter 16 is weighted heavily towards capitalism's crimes, and the crimes are real and well chosen. But the same period produced the largest and fastest reduction in extreme poverty in human history, along with enormous gains in life expectancy, literacy and child survival — hundreds of millions of people not dying of things that used to kill them.

Those are effects of the same system. You can argue about how much credit capitalism deserves for them, and plenty of serious people do, in both directions. But the argument should be **had**, and in this chapter the Opium Wars get pages and the collapse in child mortality gets almost nothing.

2. "The free market caused the slave trade" is powerful and slightly too clean

Markets ran the operation. But states enforced the property laws that made owning a person possible, protected the shipping with navies, fought the wars, administered the colonies, and enforced the contracts that made the whole thing investable.

That is not a market operating in the absence of government. It is a market operating **inside a legal system built to permit it** — and that distinction matters enormously if what you want to know is what would prevent a repeat.

3. He skips why the Industrial Revolution happened where it did

The energy-and-materials framing is excellent, and it explains the **mechanism** beautifully. It does not explain the **cause**.

Coal deposits sitting next to navigable water. High wages creating pressure to mechanise. Property law and patents. Colonial markets and colonial raw materials. A specific culture of tinkering and a market in technical books. Historians argue about the weighting of these endlessly, and Chapter 17 gives the whole question about a paragraph.

4. And the consumerism section is short on evidence

It is a persuasive story about how an ethic changed, told almost without any history of *how* it changed — the advertising industry, consumer credit, the post-war economy, mass media, the deliberate engineering of dissatisfaction.

He tells you the ethic flipped. He does not really show you the flipping, and it is one of the best-documented transformations of the twentieth century.

WORTH REMEMBERING

Before all this, people believed the pie was fixed — so trade looked like theft, and credit barely existed. One belief changed: the pie can grow. Everything financial stands on it.

Credit is trust in the future turned into money in the present, and the belief makes itself true by being believed.

Capitalism's actual commandment is reinvest, not *make money*. Adam Smith's moral argument — private greed producing public good — only works if that commandment is kept.

Markets have no morals. The Atlantic slave trade was a profitable business nobody had to order, funded by shares and insured by underwriters. Capital flows to the returns unless something outside the market stops it.

And the Industrial Revolution was a revolution in converting energy — heat into motion into electricity. The same logic applied to living animals produced the two scoreboards at their widest: the most numerous large animals on Earth, living the worst lives on Earth.

REFERENCE

Words from this part

Everything I stopped to explain, gathered up.

WORD	WHAT IT MEANS
CREDIT	Money lent now against value expected later. Trust in the future, converted into money in the present.
CAPITAL	Money and goods put back into production, as opposed to wealth, which sits still.
JOINT-STOCK COMPANY	A business owned by shareholders who can buy and sell their stake. The VOC and the East India Company were both this.
THE VOC	The Dutch East India Company, founded 1602. A company that conquered Indonesia.
BATTLE OF PLASSEY	1757. The point after which the British East India Company effectively governed Bengal.
OPIUM WARS	1839–42 and 1856–60. Britain fought China for the right to keep selling opium, in the language of free trade.
EXTERNALITY	A cost of an activity that lands on somebody who is not party to the transaction — and therefore never appears on the invoice.
CONSUMERIST ETHIC	The belief that consuming is virtuous rather than indulgent. About a century old, and near-universally obeyed.

The timeline so far

Carried forward, with these two chapters added.

WHEN	WHAT
1602	The Dutch East India Company. A joint-stock company with an army.
1719–20	The Mississippi Bubble. French royal credit never fully recovers.
c. 1712 onward	Steam engines pump water out of coal mines. Heat becomes motion.
1757	Plassey. A company begins governing Bengal.
1770	The Bengal famine, under company administration.
1776	The Wealth of Nations. Also the American Declaration of Independence.
1839–60	The Opium Wars.

WHEN	WHAT
1858	The British Crown takes over from the company, after the 1857 rebellion.
1886	Electrolysis makes aluminium cheap. A precious metal becomes foil.
20th century	Industrial farming. Consumerism. **Part 11 starts here**.

COMING NEXT

Part Eleven

Chapters 18, 19 and 20 · the Afterword · and what I actually think, now that I have finished it

The last part. Three chapters and the end of the book, and then the part where I stop explaining Harari and tell you what reading him did to me.

Chapter 18 is about what industry did to ordinary life. For almost all of history your family and your local community were your welfare state, your hospital, your school, your bank, your insurance, your police force and your court. Over about two centuries the **state** and the **market** took all of it — and Harari argues they are now the father and mother of the individual. It also contains the most optimistic passage in the book, and the one that has aged most awkwardly since 2011.

Chapter 19 asks the question nobody asks. We got richer, healthier, safer and vastly more powerful. **Are we happier?** He goes through every available answer, finds that none of them settles it, and calls it a scandal that we have barely tried to find out.

Chapter 20 is the one that turns a history book into a warning. For four billion years, life was shaped by natural selection. We are now replacing it with design — ours.

And then the afterword, and my own verdict on the whole thing.

Here is what Part Eleven takes on:

- Why time zones exist because of trains, and why your relationship with the clock is an industrial artefact
- Why modern individualism was not won against the community but **released** by two much larger institutions
- Why more people now die from sugar than from soldiers
- Why happiness tracks the gap between expectations and reality, and what that does to the entire idea of progress
- The Gilgamesh Project, seriously: a-mortality, and why it would make us the most anxious people who ever lived
- And the last and best question in the book — not *what do we want to become*, but **what do we want to want?**

End of Part Ten of Eleven · The Pie That Grows, and the Fire That Turns the Wheel

My own reading of Sapiens — Lovepreet Singh

Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, Yuval Noah Harari, 2011